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A Missile  Stability  Regime for South Asia 
Abstract 
India and  Pakistan  have  created  sizeable ballistic missile forces and are continuing 
to develop and enlarge them. These forces can be both stabilizing (e.g., providing a 
survivable force for deterrence) and destabilizing (e.g., creating strategic asymmetries). 
Missile  forces  will  be  a  factor in bilateral relations for the foreseeable future, so restraint  is 
necessary to curtail their destabilizing effects. Such restraint, however, must develop 
within an atmosphere of low  trust. This report presents  a set of political  and operational 
options, both unilateral and bilateral, that decreases tensions, helps rebuild the bilateral 
relationship,  and prepares the ground  for future steps in  structural arms control. Significant 
steps, which build on precedents and do not require extensive cooperation, are possible 
despite strained relations. The approach is made up of three distinct phases: 1) tension 
reduction  measures, 2) confidence  building  measures,  and 3) arms control  agreements. The 
goal of the first phase is to initiate unilateral steps that are substantive and decrease 
tensions,  establish  missiles  as  a security topic for bilateral discussion,  and set precedents 
for  limited  bilateral  cooperation. The second  phase  would  build  confidence  by  expanding 
current  bilateral  security  agreements, formalizing bilateral  understandings,  and  beginning 
discussion of monitoring  procedures.  The  third phase could include bilateral  agreements 
limiting  some characteristics of  national  missile forces including the cooperative 
incorporation of monitoring  and  verification. 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
South Asia is a region at risk. India and Pakistan are strategic competitors who 
became overt nuclear  powers  in 1998. Some analysts opined  that  nuclear  weapons  would 
bring stability through  mutual  deterrence.  Despite  periods of optimism, tensions  between 
Pakistan and India  remain  high  and  the last five years have been  among the most difficult 
since independence. In parallel with their nuclear programs, India and Pakistan both 
established ballistic missile programs. Both countries now have militarily significant 
missile forces and continue to develop and expand them. The pairing of missiles with 
nuclear  warheads  can  be  both  stabilizing (e.g., providing  a survivable force for deterrence) 
and destabilizing (e.g., creating  strategic  asymmetries).  It is the readiness  postures, 
doctrine, the commandcontrol structures, the types and numbers of weapons, delivery 
vehicles, and defenses available that determine the overall  effect  on  stability. 
Missiles and nuclear weapons are not going to go away from South Asia in the 
foreseeable  future. Their presence  must  thus  be  managed  in  a  way  that does not  add to their 
destabilizing features while  preserving the elements of deterrence. Thus, restraint  is 
necessary to reduce the risks resulting  from  the  India-Pakistan missile competition. 
Restraint  can  be  achieved  through an incremental process  beginning  with  tension reducing 
measures,  moving  on to confidence  building  measures,  and  eventually  concluding in  arms 
control  agreements. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how India and  Pakistan  could structure 
their missile programs to increase stability and avoid damaging the existing state of 
deterrence. Steps to increase stability should support the concept of minimum credible 
deterrence advocated  by  both  countries. There are a  number  of actions that  can  improve 
current conditions  and  head  off uture problems. 
To provide the context for the conceptual missile restraint regime, the report 
reviews the Pakistani and Indian missile programs dating back to 1983 and notes their 
linkage with political and security events that occurred in South Asia over the last two 
decades. Missile systems  have  assumed  special  significance  in both countries  because  they 
are used as instruments of both  strategy  and diplomacy. Missiles are displayed  prominently 
in national  parades  and flight tests are timed for political purposes. These actions are aimed 
at impressing multiple audiences: the adversary  is  expected to be  deterred, the domestic 
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audience - that  views  missiles  as  symbols of pride and  prestige - is placated  with  messages 
of resolve, and outside  powers  are  induced  to  focus  on  the  region  and  possibly  intervene 
and diffuse  crises. 
The  study  assesses  missile  operations  relative  to  the role of intelligence,  command 
and control, and the geophysical conditions in South Asia. Seven key characteristics of 
missiles (short time of flight, range, pre-launch survivability, accuracy, autonomy after 
launch,  response  time,  and  ambiguity  about  the  type of warhead)  are  assessed  within  the 
context of South  Asia to determine  whether  they  are  inherently  stabilizing  or  destabilizing. 
The answer to the  problems of stability  identified  in  the  analysis lies in greater  yet 
controlled  transparency.  The  United  Nations  defines  transparency as “the  systematic 
provision of information about specific aspects of military activities under formal or 
informal international arrangements.” Transparency can be unilateral or bilateral, and 
governments do not  typically  ratify  transparency  agreements.  Sometimes it is in a  state’s 
best  interest  to  act  unilaterally  to  avoid  misinterpretation of intent. In practice,  there is a 
role for both  transparency  and  opacity  in  missile  threat  perception  reduction.  Choosing ot
to share  certain  information  can  enhance  stability. 
Within  the  context of the  increasing linkage of missiles  with  power  projection  and 
as deterrent  forces, this report  defines  elements of a  conceptual  missile  restraint  regime for 
India  and  Pakistan.  Recognizing  that  India-Pakistan  relations are poor,  a  phased  approach 
to  the  evolution of a  missile  restraint  regime is proposed (1) tension  reduction  measures, 
(2) confidence building measures, and (3) arms control agreements. This process could 
eventually  evolve into broader  agreements  on  arms  control and reductions  with  favorable 
political  conditions. The process  includes  both  unilateral and bilateral  actions  that 
contribute to rebuilding bilateral relationships, increasing confidence and preparing the 
qround for structural arms control if favorable  conditions  occur. 
The  conceptual  regime  seeks  to  reduce the key  sources  of  instability  by: 
Decreasing the overall perception of threats created by missile development and 
deployment 
Removing the  ambiguity  created by  missiles capable of delivering  both 
conventional  and  nuclear  warheads 
Decreasing  the risk of  unintentional  conflict 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
Increasing the time  for  communication  and  consultation during a crisis 
Avoiding a missile race by capping the ability to develop new classes of missiles 
while maintaining the existing capability for deterrence. 
The goal of the first phase, tension reduction measures, is to make missiles a 
security  topic for bilateral discussion, initiate unilateral  steps to decrease tensions,  and set a 
precedent for bilateral  cooperation: 
Exercise restraint  in official statements  and  displays of missiles 
Reinvigorate  existing  agreements  on notifications of military  exercises 
Declare no  use  of  artillery  rockets across the  Line of Control 
Declare that  nuclear  warheads are not  routinely  mated to missiles 
Agree  not  to  conduct flight tests  during crises 
Continue  and reinforce the practice of advance announcement of missile  tests 
Initiate cooperation in international treaties  and  organizations 
Initiate official military-to-military contacts. 
The second  phase,  confidence  building  measures,  would  expand  transparency 
measures, formalize bilateral understandings, and begin discussion and experimentation 
with  monitoring  procedures for limitations  on  missile-related  activity: 
Developing joint delegations to various international bodies 
Declare elements of the  national  missile  command and control structure 
Invite observers to missile  tests,  and  military exercises 
Bilaterally declare that the Hatf-1  and Prithvi-1 are non-nuclear systems 
Establish  Risk  Reduction  Centers  at  the  National  Command  Authorities 
Establish  new consultative lines of communication  between  command authorities 
Formalize a  bilateral missile test  notification  agreement 
Initiate additional military-to-military contacts. 
The thud phase, arms control agreements, could include bilateral agreements to 
increase communications,  limit  missile-related activity, or  remove some aspect of national 
missile  forces,  with  the cooperative incorporation of monitoring  and  verification: 
Limit the number  and frequencies of missile  tests 
11 
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Bilaterally declare that no missile garrisons will be located within a specified 
distance from the border 
Establish  an  agreement  defining  missiles  with 150 to 250 km range as non-nuclear 
systems  (specifically  the  Hatf-2  and  Prithvi-2). 
Establish  an  agreement to eliminate  short-range  ballistic  missiles  with less than 150 
km range  (specifically  the  Hatf-1  and  Prithvi-1). 
Establish  a  bilateral  nuclear  test  ban. 
The Indian  and Pakistani missile  programs  have  significantly  altered  threat 
perceptions in South Asia. Although ballistic missile forces support the goal of credible 
deterrence, each country’s reactions to the perceived threats posed by the other could 
engender actions that are destabilizing. The remedy for this instability lies in mutual 
restraint in missile-related activities facilitated by selective transparency. There are a 
number of procedural and technical options - both unilateral and cooperative - that can 
maintain  the  stabilizing  aspects of deterrence  while  reducing  destabilizing  effects.  These 
options  should  be  integrated into a  system,  or  regime, to gain the maximum  benefits for 
stability. Public confidence in these initiatives is important. Public confidence drives 
politics,  which,  in turn, defines  the  acceptability of cooperation.  The  benefit of strategic 
stability needs to be made clear to the respective publics. The political and operational 
process of building  a  restraint  regime  can  evolve  over  time  as  confidence and experience 
increase. 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
. Introduction  and  Context 
South Asia is a  region  at risk. India  and  Pakistan are strategic  competitors  with  a 
history of threat  making  and  conducting  provocative  military exercises. They  became  overt 
nuclear  powers in 1998. India  has  ambitions of becoming  a  global  power, and maintains 
one of the largest standing armies in the world, along with a blue water navy and a 
sophisticated air force. Pakistan views India as its primary threat and has developed 
sizeable  military forces to achieve a  rough  parity  with its larger  neighbor. 
Missiles with increasing sophistication are being introduced to the region at the 
same time that  nuclear  weapons are being  developed  and  produced. In South Asia,  missile 
systems have assumed  special significance because  they are used as instruments of both 
strategy and diplomacy.  Missiles are displayed  publicly  in defense exhibitions and  national 
parades.  Such  tactics are aimed at impressing  multiple  audiences:  the  adversary is expected 
to be deterred; the domestic audience - that views missiles as symbols of pride and 
prestige - is  placated  with  messages of resolve;  and outside powers are induced to focus on 
the  region  and  possibly intervene and  diffuse crises. 
The combination of missiles and nuclear warheads can be either stabilizing or 
destabilizing to the region. It is the readiness  postures, the command  and  control  structures, 
the types and numbers of weapons, delivery vehicles, and defenses available that will 
determine  the  overall effect. Thus, restraint is necessary to achieve  stability  and reduce the 
risks  resulting from unbridled  India-Pakistan  missile  competition. Restraint can  be 
introduced  and  stability  achieved through an  incremental  process  passing  through  tension 
reducing measures, confidence building measures, and eventually concluding in arms 
control agreements. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how India and Pakistan 
could structure their missile programs to increase stability  and  avoid  damaging the existing 
state of deterrence. 
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1 .l. Problem Statement 
It is impossible to expect  that  missiles  will  disappear  soon from the South Asian 
stage - both  India  nd  Pakistan  have  invested  considerable  resources in missile 
development and procurement, and have inducted various missile systems into their 
militaries.  Missiles  have  become  symbols of national  pride. The risk is that  either  side  may 
misunderstand  missile-related  activities.  It is important;  therefore,  that India and  Pakistan 
initiate  and  develop  a  missile  restraint  regime  that  manages  the  respective  missile  programs 
in  a  manner  that  promotes  stability. 
1.2. Goals of the Study I 
This paper examines whether missile development and induction in South Asia 
improves or worsens regional stability. Within this context, the paper goes on to define 
elements of a  conceptual  missile  restraint regime for  India  and  Pakistan.  Although  steps 
toward  reconciliation  have  recently  occurred,  India-Pakistan  relations  have  a long way to 
go to achieve  full  normalization.'  Consequently, an incremental  approach to the evolution 
of a  missile  restraint  regime is proposed. The process  could  eventually  evolve into broader 
agreements on arms control and reductions  with  favorable  political  conditions.  This  paper 
will  hopefully  be  complementary to the  restarted  India-Pakistan  security  dialog. 
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2004, structural dialog  restarted. a 
a 
a 
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A  Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
2. Missiles in South Asia 
To frame this analysis, the Indian and Pakistani missile programs are reviewed and 
operational factors  in South Asia  assessed  in this section. 
2.1. Definition of Missiles 
In general,  a rocket is  a  self-propelled  cylinder  using liquid or solid fuel. In modem 
military  terminology,  a  rocket  is an unguided  weapon.  The  mission of military  rockets is 
similar to that of artillery,  except  they are used at longer  ranges  (usually  less  than 75 km). 
A missile, in  the  military context, is  a  rocket  with  a  guidance  system  that adjusts its flight 
path  to the target  after  launch. 
Military  missiles fall into two  major  categories:  ballistic  and  cruise. Ballistic 
missiles have an initial powered boost phase followed by supersonic free flight along a 
high, arcing trajectory.  This  trajectory  is the ballistic  trajectory of a  hurled  object. 
Guidance occurs during the boost phase and, in more advanced systems, during the re- 
entry phase. The term "cruise missile" refers to unmanned, automatically guided, self- 
propelled air-breathing vehicles that sustain flight through the use of aerodynamic lift. 
Missiles can also be  categorized  by virtue of  their  points of launching and  impact, type of 
propulsive  system,  and  guidance  system. 
This paper focuses on surface-to-surface ballistic missiles  because  they have been 
integrated into the military  forces of India  and  Pakistan  and  play the greatest strategic role. 
Cruise missiles, however, are under development in both countries and will become a 
factor  in the strategic balance  in the future. 
2.2. The Evolution of the Indian  and  Paklstanl  Missile  Programs 
Although  both  India  and  Pakistan  have  maintained  civilian space programs  since 
the 1960's, it was not until India began the Integrated Guided Missile Development 
Program (IGMDP) in 1983 that the missile race began in earnest. India began with a 
modest  technological  base.  By skillfully deriving technologies  from the existing civilian 
space program and combining them with reverse engineering of missile hardware from 
Russia and elsewhere, India developed the Agni and Prithvi missiles. The short range 
Prithvi (fiist tested  in  1986)  was derived from  Russian-supplied  surface to air  missiles (the 
SA-2),  and the medium  range  Agni (fiist tested in 1989) was  partly  based  on the US Scout 
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and  Russian  SA-2.*  India  now  has a significant  technical base and  an ambitious military 
missile  program.  In addition, it has a world-class  civilian  space  program. The development 
of intermediate range ballistic  missiles  (IRBMs)  is  on  track and most  analysts conclude 
that India could develop intercontinental ballistic missiles  (ICBMs) if it chose. 
Juxtaposed  within this matrix of Indian  missile  development,  were some disturbing 
crises in the mid-eighties. The serial South Asian crises began with India’s decision to 
occupy the undemarcated  Siachen  Glacier  in  1984. This operation  was  conducted amidst 
ongoing  tensions over the Sikh Crisis in the Indian State of Punjab,  bordering  Pakistan. 
Two years later, India conducted the ambitious Brasstacks military exercise that created 
tensions in India  and Pakistan, which  escalated close to war.  In  each of these two crises, 
India has been accused of planning a pre-emptive strike against Kahuta, Pakistan’s 
uranium enrichment fa~i l i ty .~ The plans were obviously rejected. By 1990, as the Cold 
War ended and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Kashmir witnessed a renewed 
freedom struggle and a major uprising that continues to date. India accuses Pakistan of 
fueling this uprising  with  financial  and  material  support. The uprising came about  under a 
new  global  and  regional  environment.  After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the 
US-Pakistan partnership also ended. The first manifestation of this change  was  the 
imposition of sanctions by the US (the Pressler Amendment) based on alleged uranium 
enrichment. The sanctions  halted the delivery  of  previously  purchased  F-16  aircraft. 
At the time, aircraft were the only long-range weapons delivery means for both 
countries. Pakistan thus found itself caught in a difficult situation. While its nuclear 
capability was the ultimate guarantor of deterrence, the F-16 was to  be the main Pakistani 
delivery system to enable some sort of balance with India. The US refusal to deliver 
additional  F-16s  was a major  blow  for  Pakistan’s quest for balance.  In fact, the air force 
imbalance  widened as India  continued to purchase state-of-the-art aircraft from  Russia  and 
France. It was then that Pakistan contemplated seeking a matching response in ballistic 
* Rodney  Jones,  Mark McDonougb,  Toby  Dalton,  and  Gregory  Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A 
Guide in Maps and Charts, (Washington  DC: Camegie Endowment for Peace,  1998) p.127-129. 
See reports  in  Times of India , News  Service, September  17  and  18 , 1984 and  Indian  Express, New  Delhi 
September  19,  1984  Scott  Sagan  “The  Perils  of  Proliferation,”  CISAC  Stanford  University  workshop on 
“Preventing  War in South Asia,” Bangkok,  August 2001. Raj  Chengappa, Weuponsfor Peace: The  Secret 
Story ofIndia’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power, (New  Delhi: Harper Collins  Publishers, 2000) pp 322-323. 
Also See Abdul  Sattar  “Reducing  Nuclear  Dangers  in South Asia:  A Pakistani  Perspective”, Non- 
Proliferation Review, Winter 1995, p. 42. 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
missiles. The US embargo of the F-16s thus helped drive the Pakistani  missile  program. 
The missile program, along with nuclear weapon development, became a top national 
security  priority for Pakistan. 
Pakistan  faced  two  major  problems:  a  limited  indigenous  technology base and the 
Missile  Technology Control Regime  (MTCR).  At  the  time,  Pakistan’s  technology base for 
missile  development  was  even  more  limited  than  India. The soft technology (organization, 
management,  technical staff) was  not the problem. The deficiencies  were  in  the  realm of 
hard technology (reentry vehicles, guidance systems, engines, and launch  platform^).^ 
Like the nuclear  program,  Pakistan  was  a late starter  in the missile program  and faced the 
same non-proliferation  barriers.  India’s lead in missiles  and its strategy to “indigenize” the 
technology  by reverse engineering  and  expanding its indigenous  technical  base  could  not 
be  easily  matched  by  Pakistan. Pakistan’s indigenous industrial base was  much  smaller  but 
its security  requirements  were  urgent,  and  thus the prime objective was to redress  security 
concerns promptly. Unlike India, there was a time premium to develop missiles quickly 
and also create a strong technical base before the window of opportunity for obtaining 
technical expertise and hardware transfers  closed. 
The second factor was  that  Pakistan’s  quest for acquisition of missile technology 
met  with  stiff resistance from  the  MTCR.  With the bulk  of  western  suppliers  in the MTCR, 
Pakistan  reached  out  on two paths for both liquid fuel and solid  fuel  propulsion  systems.  In 
the  early 199Os, the only remaining  and  willing  suppliers  were in North  Korea  and  China, 
respectively, for these two propulsion systems. Thus, Pakistan’s liquid and solid fuel 
missile  acquisition  was  achieved  in  a race to beat the closing iron  grip of the MTCR.  By 
combining  various available technologies  such as French Centaure sounding rockets and 
Soviet Scuds, Pakistan was able to produce the Hatf-1 and Hatf-2 missiles in the initial 
phases. Later, reverse engineering of M-series  missiles  from  China  nd  No-dong 
technology  from  North  Korea  enabled  Pakistan to develop a sufficient missile 
technological base independent of MTCR  limitations. 
Pakistan was constrained  in its flight tests  for two reasons. First, Pakistan  had  to 
avoid  MTCR  sanctions  as  much  as it could, not just for itself  but also to save 
4 Aaron K a r p ,  Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Techniques (New York Oxford University 
Press, 1996), pp. 51-146. 
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embarrassment  o its principal ally China.  Second, it had  remained  under  constant 
diplomatic  pressure from the  United States government to exercise  self-restraint. Since the 
early  1990’s  the US had  been  applying  unilateral  pressure  on  Pakistan  to  undertake  “self- 
restraint  measures,”  which,  defined in practical  terms,  asked  for five major  steps:  1) do not 
conduct live tests; 2) prohibit field training; 3) do not  co-locate  key  missile  components  in 
a  single area; 4) do not  mate  warheads  and  launch  vehicles;  and 5 )  and do not  store  key 
elements of missile  hardware  within  operational  range of targets in India. 
Given that developments across the border in India were unhindered, it was 
obviously  not  possible for Pakistan to agree to such unilateral measures. To placate US 
nonproliferation concerns, Pakistan  proposed  a  “Zero  Missile”  regime  in  South  Asia,  but 
India refused. The US, however, continued to put pressure on Pakistan, while tacitly 
looking for ways to grandfather technology transfers if Pakistan agreed to refrain from 
public  displays  and  flight  ests.  Pakistan’s  missile  development  was  thus  conducted 
weighing  the  trade-off  between  diplomatic  costs  and  developmental  imperatives. 
Although they followed quite different  routes  to  missile  system  acquisition,  both 
India  and  Pakistan  now have quite mature  missile  development,  testing and manufacturing 
infrastructures.  The  key  issues  remaining relate to the  management  and  operation of their 
missile  systems. 
2.3. Operational Considerations for Missiles 
Operational considerations in South Asia for missile deployments are different 
from those that  prevailed  during  the  Cold  War.  There  is,  however, an interesting  parallel in 
that  the  US  and  the Soviet Union  (and  now  Russia)  had  differing  states of alert for their 
strategic  nuclear  forces  depending  on  the  severity of a crisis, much  as is the case for India 
and  Pakistan.  Neither  the US nor  the  Russians  normally  kept all their nuclear  forces in the 
highest  states of alert. The state of alert  changed  with  security  conditions.  The US twice 
brought  nuclear  weapons  and  their  delivery  systems  to  a  heightened state of alert  during 
the Cold War. The US strategic alert scale goes from Defense Condition (DefCon)-4 
(normal  peacetime)  to  DefCon-1  (war  imminent).  During  the  Cuban  Crisis  (1962)  and  the 
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A Missile Stabilify Regime for South Asia 
Arab-Israeli War (1973), the state of alert was reportedly increased to DefCon-3; that 
defines  that  “troops are on standby  to await further  order^."^ 
During  the  Kargil Crisis of 1999  and the Compound  Crises of 2001-2002, Indian 
and  Pakistani  conventional forces were  mobilized  and  put  on  the highest state of alert? 
There is no evidence, however, of an increased alert status or deployment of nuclear 
weapons  in  the  manner  that  happened  in  Cold  War  crises.  Missiles  and  weapon 
components,  however,  may  have  been  moved to different locations for defensive reasons. 
Conducting  defensive  measures  is  analogous to the actions  taken  during  “Orange Threat 
Level”  terrorism  alerts  in the US.’ Precautionary  security  measures are taken  when  a state 
of national  vulnerability is deemed  present. 
Threat perceptions are driven by probabilities and consequences of events and 
responses  may  be  based  on  worse case scenarios. In 1998,  immediately  after  the  nuclear 
tests by India, concern  mounted in Pakistan  that  India  might  carry  out  a preventative strike 
at Pakistani  nuclear installations. Pakistan  took defensive measures as a  result,  creating the 
perception in the US that  Pakistan  was “reacting to false alarms”  and  creating instability. 
Fortunately,  neither side construed these defensive measures  involving the movement of 
nuclear forces or  their  enhanced defense as an  escalatory  move. Will this hold true in the 
next  India-Pakistan crisis? 
Official statements by India and Pakistan about the deployment status of their 
nuclear  weapons are infrequent but  occasionally  provide some insight.* The draft (1999) 
Indian  Nuclear  Doctrine  implies  that  nuclear  weapons are not  normally kept ready for use 
and that their readiness is increased during a crisis or conflict: “The doctrine envisages 
assured capability to shift from  peacetime  deployment to fully employable forces in the 
’ Bruce Blair “Alerting in Crisis and Conventional  War”  in  Ashton  Carter, John Ste inbmer  and  Charles A 
Zraket eds., Managing Nuclear  Operations (Washington  DC,  Brookings) pp 75-120. 
The December 2001 attack on the  Indian  Parliament led to a massive  military  mobilization  (including naval 
perilously close to  war  when a second  attack  occurred  in  May 2002 at  Kaluchak,  Kashmir. 
deployments) by India  and  Pakistan  and a confrontation along their borders. The  two countries came 
’ “Orange Alert” refers to heightened  security  risk as defined by the US Department  of  Homeland  Security  in 
the  wake of the  September 11,2001 terrorist attack. 
interview  with  Indian  officials is contained  in  Ashley  Tellis’s India’s Emerging Nuclear  Posture:  Between 
Recessed Deterrent  and  Ready Arsenal (2001, New  Delbi: Oxford University  Press). 
An extensive discussion of th is  issue,  with  numerous  references  from the open literature and based  on 
19 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 
shortest  possible time....”9 When  asked by The Hindu newspaper  on  November  29, 1999 if 
it was  correct to conclude that  India  follows different peace-time  and war-time deployment 
postures, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh replied “This would be a correct 
assessment. You know  that  we  would like to convey  a  sense of assurance  in our region, 
also beyond so that our deployment posture is not  perceived as de-stabilising. We have 
rejected  notions of ‘launch  on  warning  postures’  that  lead  to  maintaining  hair  trigger alerts, 
thus  increasing the risks of unauthorized launch.”” 
Pakistan  has  not  declared  a  nuclear doctrine but statements  imply  a similar 
approach. The Pakistani  Foreign  Secretary  formally  proposed the non-mating of nuclear 
weapons  and delivery systems  in  aspeech at the plenary of the Conference on 
Disarmament  on January 25,2001.’’ 
As a  result of statements like these, analysts  commonly  assume  Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear deployment to be in a “recessed” form. A recessed deployment status 
means that warheads are stored  separately from delivery systems  and that the warheads are 
stored as disassembled  components.  However, as a crisis develops, the readiness posture of 
nuclear  weapons  is  expected to progressively change, moving through stages of increasing 
alert until a nuclear-armed delivery system reaches a ready-to-use state. Because the 
nuclear force is  progressively reconstituted, both the location of warhead  components  and 
delivery  systems  and  their  proximity to each  other are important.  During the Cold War, the 
evolution of a crisis did  not  affect the deployment  status of nuclear  weapons as 
significantly. 
The process of reconstitution raises questions about the risks associated  with  the 
changing  deployment  status of nuclear  weapons  during an unfolding  crisis  and  their effect 
on  stability.  Many  analysts believe a  strategy of recessed deterrence is inherently 
stabilizing. Such a strategy actually entails some risks that are potentially destabilizing. 
When the recessed  components of a  nuclear  deterrent force are brought into a  more active 
readiness state, in a short time frame there is an increased risk of misperceptions and 
accidents. Furthermore, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are vulnerable to 
Section 3.2, Draft Indian Nuclear  Doctrine, Indian of Ministry of External Affairs  website: 
www.meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm. 
lo Indian Government  Ministry of External Affairs  website: www.meadev.nic.in/govt!eamint-nov28.htm. 
Volume 9, Number 2, pp. 47 - 48. 
I’ Naeem  Ahmad Salik, “Missile Issues in South Asia,” The Nonprol$eration Review, Summer 2002, 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
conventional or nuclear counterforce strikes when in a recessed posture. Missiles or 
warheads would be prime targets of the opposing air force or special operations forces 
during a war.  Conventional strikes could also threaten the command  and  control  structure 
that  is  necessary for the reconstitution of a nuclear  force. If a limited  conventional  war 
were to occur, strikes  against  nuclear assets might occur inadvertently during attacks on 
other targets. Given India's geographic and military advantages, Pakistan, in particular, 
may perceive itself to be vulnerable. Thus, a recessed status could be stabilizing with 
respect to safety and control but destabilizing in the sense that it might encourage a 
preemptive  strike. 
The establishment of deterrence in South Asia is complicated by a strategy of 
recessed nuclear deployment. Effective deterrence actually requires some transparency 
regarding the nuclear force's operational capability and survivability. With a force in a 
peacetime state of recessed deterrence, transparency  measures  to  establish  deterrence  need 
to be carefully defined so as  not to create vulnerabilities  that  degrade crisis stability. Crisis 
stability is a situation in which neither side believes that it can gain an advantage by 
initiating a preemptive strike.I2 Recessed nuclear deployment also complicates operational 
doctrine. The goal of crisis stability (to have a survivable deterrent through a dispersed 
force structure) is in some conflict with the goal of operational preparedness (to have a 
tightly  controlled force structure). 
In the five years since overt nuclearization,  tensions  have increased in South  Asia. 
Crises have not  disappeared - in fact, they have occurred with disquieting regularity. If 
India  and  Pakistan are to effectively work  through  issues of stability associated  with crises, 
diplomatic efforts must  commence  to  contain a future crisis. Communication links, crisis 
prevention  centers,  and  third  parties  can facilitate these efforts. The hotline connecting the 
Directors-General of Military  Operations  (DGMOs) is helpful in routine clarification  and 
may  help  prevent an impending cr i s i~ . '~  This  confidence  building  measure,  however,  is  not 
designed to defuse an  unfolding crisis. For that,  unambiguous  communication  must occur 
at the highest possible  levels of leadership. 
"This definition has been developed by the Center  for  Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies (Monterey, CA). 
l 3  Under  the Hotline Agreement, the DGMOs talk for  approximately 30 minutes  every  Tuesday  at a pre- 
designated t i m e .  
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2.3.1. Misslle Operations  in  India  and  Pakistan 
Some of the  operational  conditions  that  may  cause  instability  with  regard  to missile 
iorce operations  are as follows: 
Absence of Timely Intelligence. Missile movement is a potential source of escalation. 
The  command  system  requires  timely  and  accurate  information. At present,  the 
capacity to collect this information is limited. India and Pakistan rely on remotely 
piloted  vehicles (RPVs), human  and  electronic  intelligence.  In  the  absence of 
comprehensive  and  accurate  intelligence,  there is a  significant  chance  that  an  adversary 
will misread passive dispersal and initiate its own deployment as a result. During a 
crisis, India and Pakistan could enter into a spiral of escalation. One side could 
interpret  the  defensive  moves by the  other  as  threatening.  Steps  taken  to  counter  the 
perceived  threat  would be matched  in  turn  by  the  other,  resulting  in  further  escalation. 
During a condition of heightened tensions, the intelligence organizations in both 
countries  will  likely  have  a  tendency to report the first indications of activity  even if 
not  confirmed. 
The Dilemma of Control. Wide and flexible dispersal is within the capability of both 
countries, but if exercised, it will underscore the problem of control. Dispersal of 
missiles  during  a crisis is understandable  within  the context of preserving  survivability. 
The foremost dilemma facing the command authority will be retaining centralized 
control. Assertive negative ~ont ro l ’~  is desirable for stability but will undermine the 
effectiveness  of  the  missile  system to rapidly  respond  if  required.  Pre-delegation, on 
the  other  hand,  will  increase  the risk of inad~ertence.’~ The  command  system will thus 
be under extreme stress if dispersal or deployment ever takes place. The principal 
decision-making  problem is how  to make an  optimum  trade-off  between  battle 
effectiveness  and  safety.  The  evolving  national  command  systems  will  have to find an 
answer to this problem,  which  was  not easily solved  in  the  Cold  war. 
l4 Peter Feaver, “Command and Contml in  Emerging Nuclear Nations.” Zntemational Security 17:3:160-187 
(Winter  1992-1993). 
l5 Bany Posen, Inadvertent  Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear R i s h  (Ithaca, NY: Cornel1 
University Press 1999). 
22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
Harsh Geophysical Conditions. Both countries have sufficient territorial space and 
variety of terrain for dispersal and concealment. However, the road network is not well 
developed in both countries. Conditions for mobility are harsh and compounded by 
generally hostile weather. Physical security must be maintained. There are multiple 
modes for missile deployment each having its own unique problems of safety in 
movement. The  variety of missiles available may further compound  the safety issues of 
mating them  with the warhead -both conventional and  nuclear. 
2.3.2. Nuclear Linkages 
Greater instability results when the potential operational problems of missiles just 
described are linked with the  deployment of nuclear  weapons.  At least four major 
considerations will  play into decisions by India and Pakistan to undertake nuclear 
deployment. 
Political and Technical Control. The imperative for political control is critical and 
deployment will pose a major control challenge. To ensure survivability, there will be a 
tendency to deploy a large rather than a small proportion of the national nuclear 
arsenal. The command and control requirements are fundamentally the same for any 
number of deployed nuclear weapons.  As Sir Michael Quinlan points out, 
“...requirements do not, however, decrease proportionally with size; it is not to be 
supposed that a small nuclear force does not  need sophisticated control - indeed, small 
size may entail a potential vulnerability that heightens demands.”I6 Dispersal may 
involve different configurations ranging from prepared nuclear weapons integrated 
with  t eir delivery means to separated nuclear weapon components moving 
independently from delivery systems. 
Pressure on the command system to pre-delegate authority will rise as a crisis 
spirals.  The political release to fire nuclear weapons could be technically controlled by 
incorporating permissive action links (PALs) in weapons.  A  PAL  is a coded switch that 
controls the arming of the weapon.  PALs require the entry of a code in order to open 
‘6Michael Quinlan, “How Robust is India-Pakistan  Deterrence?” Survival, Volume 42, Number 4, Winter 
ZOOO-01, p. 148. 
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circuits that arm the weapon.” Even if PALs are used, the decision to delegate 
authority and release warheads to military units in the field will be excruciatingly 
difficult for both  India  and Paki~tan.’~ 
Communication Problems. The essence of command  and  control is to have  several  layers 
of redundant communication to ensure effective assertive control. The absence of 
assured  redundancy  and  secure  communication  will  remain  aprime  concern. 
Overcoming electronic jamming in a conventional war, and electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) effects  in  the  event of outbreak of a  nuclear  war,  will be other  critical  needs. 
Need for Physical  Security. The  possibility of nuclear  weapons  being  stolen is remote, as 
multiple  tiers  of  security  will  always be present,  but  concerns  about  safety  and  security 
will certainly grow during deployment. Deployment will increase the importance of 
physical  control by the  command  system  even if use  control  systems  such  as  PALs are 
incorporated. I 
International Opprobrium. India and Pakistan  will face international  opprobrium if they 
opt to deploy nuclear weapons. Although the international community may have 
reluctantly  accepted  their  possession of nuclear  weapons,  the  transition  to  operational 
deployments  will  likely  lead to sanctions  and  isolation. This factor is unique  to  South 
Asia  and  constrains  the  implementation of deterrence  strategies  by  Pakistan  and  India. 
For  example,  during  the  Kargil  conflict,  reports  that  both  countries had activated and 
deployed  their  nuclear missile forces  triggered  intense  international  pressure  on  both 
countries. National actions, such as signaling, that play a role in deterrence strategy 
may  thus  be  constrained  by  international  pressure.  In  contrast,  offensive  conventional 
force  deployments do not  seem  to  engender  the  same  level  of  concern in the 
international  community. 
I 
Massachusetts:  Ballinger  Publishing  Company, 1984). 
l7 Thomas  Cochran, William Arkin and Milton Hoenig, US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. (Cambridge, 
provincial control for efficient use of the armed  forces. See Managing  Nuclear  Operations,  pp 354-356. 
Paul  Bracken has defined  two levels of  control. He refers to political control for statecraft and  strategy and 
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A Missile Stability Regime for South Asia 
3. StabilityAnstability  Resulting From Missiles 
3.1. Stability and  transparency 
The United Nations defines transparency as “the systematic provision of 
information about specific aspects of military activities under formal or informal 
international  arrangement^."'^ Transparency can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, and 
governments do not typically ratify transparency agreements. Sometimes it is  in a state’s 
best interest to act unilaterally to avoid misinterpretation of intent. In practice, there is a 
role for both transparency and opacity in missile threat perception reduction. Choosing not 
to share certain information can enhance stability. Such information includes system 
deployment locations, system vulnerabilities, and  performance capabilities. 
The  answer to the problems highlighted in Section 2.0 lies in greater and controlled 
transparency. Selected transparency in missile-related activities can increase stability by 
increasing confidence in both sides. Actions  to increase military transparency have 
historically been  used to build confidence between adversaries and sometimes to  build  the 
foundation for subsequent arms control agreements. 
When defining transparency actions for missiles, a matrix of potential information 
sharing actions and stabilityhtability impacts needs to be assessed. Figure 1 shows 
examples of actions that fit the quadrants of a stabilityhransparency matrix.*’  The 
destabilizing examples emphasize asymmetries in capabilities and failure to reveal 
important information that could lead to misinterpretation. The stabilizing examples show 
actions intended to avoid misinterpretation and to minimize vulnerabilities of critical 
assets. 
l9 United  Nations  Experts  Group, Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International 
Tranders of Conventional Arms, Report to the Secretary General, UN Document Al461301, Sept. 9,1991. 
Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and  Brinkmanship in South Asia, Michael  Krepon and Chris Cagne, ed., Henry 
L. Stimson  Center  Report No 38, June 2001, p 59. 
Kent  Biringer  “Missile Threat Reduction  and Monitoring in South Asia”, The Stability- Znstubility 
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DEMONSTRATE 
EXPANDED MISSILE 
RANGEAND 
PAYLOAD 
CAPABILITIES 
(promotes arms race) 
NO  CONSULTATIONS 
ON  MISSILE  ALERT 
STATUS DURING 
CONVENTIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 
(risks misinterpretation) 
DESTABILIZING 
--GEmYw#j 
LAUNCH 
NOTIFICATION 
(avoids misinterpretation) 
WITHHOLD A LIST O m  
STABILIZING 
Figure 1: Example of a  StabilityRransparency  Matrix 
Generally, transparency leads to greater stability when the following criteria are 
achieved as a  result  of  providing  information: 
Increased  symmetry of forces andor capabilities 
Increased  warning  time or reduced  likelihood of preemption  success 
Reduced  likelihood of misinterpretation of intent 
Reduced vulnerabilities for either side. 
3.2. Stability Factors in South Asian Missile Deployment 
To apply the stability  matrix  approach to South  Asia,  seven  significant 
characteristics of ballistic missiles  are  analyzed  for  their  stabilizing or destabilizing  effects. 
This analysis is based  on  the  associated  level  and  effects  of  a  chosen  characteristic - that 
is,  what is the effect on stability of the  missile  characteristic if it increases or decreases? 
3.2.1. Time of Flight 
Ballistic missiles are the fastest means to deliver a warhead to a target at long 
range. In a matter of a  few  minutes,  a  missile  can  travel  hundreds of kilometers. In the 
South Asian context, missile flight times will generally be under ten minutes. Since 
geography is fixed,  flight  times  only  change as the  targets  and  launch  points  change.  There 
is some potential for relatively long-range missiles  to  be  used  against short-range targets 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
A Missile Stabiliry Regime for South Asia 
by flying  in  a  depressed  trajectory  mode  and decrease the typical time of flight by 2 or 3 
minutes.’l Such use  of long-range missiles  assumes the country  is  willing to reduce a  long- 
range missile’s survivability by moving it close to its target, and to forgo the use of a 
scarce  military  asset against distant strategic  targets.  Because  geography  and the physics of 
flight are fixed, the effect of flight time is  neutral.  Flight time will  always  be  short  and the 
use of a  technique like depressed flight trajectory  makes  a  relatively small difference. The 
fact  that flight times are short  does,  however, encourage a  defending  country to 
contemplate  a  more  ready  response  posture  (discussed  in  Section  3.2.6)  that  could include 
plans for a counter-launch under attack, or a preemptive attack on indication of an 
impending missile attack. 
3.2.2. Range 
Short-range  missiles are much  simpler to develop and  cheaper  to  build  than 
missiles of  medium  or  intercontinental  range. A long-range  missile  requires  more  powerful 
engines;  a  stronger, lighter structure; a  more  precise  guidance  system;  and  more  protection 
against  aerodynamic  heating  than  does  a  short-range  missile.  Mere  extrapolation of short- 
range rocket technologies is not  sufficient. 
The ranges of Indian and  Pakistani  missiles are currently sufficient to cover  all the 
significant  high  value  targets of each  country  (approximately  1500 - 2500 km). The  ranges 
are also sufficient that each country can be assured of a wide enough dispersal of its 
missiles to make  them  secure  against  a  preemptive strike. Future developments, therefore, 
will probably focus on payload, accuracy, and development of naval platforms. In the 
Indian and Pakistani dyad, therefore, increasing range has medium positive effect on 
stability. 
What is not clear, however, is whether further increases in range will cause 
instability.  India  may  seek  to increase the range of its missiles to be able to strike deeper 
into  China. This may cause China to focus greater  attention  on  India’s  missile  forces,  and 
target  them  more aggressively. This may  lead to greater  numbers of Indian  missiles,  with  a 
corresponding  cascading effect on  Pakistan’s  missile forces. 
M. V. Ramana,  R.  Rajaraman, Z. Mian;  Nuclear  Early  Warning  Issues  in South Asia:  Problems  and  Issues, 
EPW  Special  Series,  January 17,2004. 
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3.2-3. Pre-launch  Survivability 
Missiles can be made difficult to destroy before launch. The US and the Soviet 
Union protected their ICBMs by installing them in hardened underground silos or by 
deploying  them  as  submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Other  options include 
basing  them in caves  or  tunnels.  Transporter-erector-launchers  (TELs)  can  be  used for all 
but  he  largest  missiles  and  constitute  small,  hard-to-find,  mobile  targets.  The  most 
common  basing  option for regional  ballistic  missile  forces is the  TEL. TELs are  cheaper 
than fixed silos and, as was shown in the 1991 Gulf War, quite survivable. Liquid-fuel 
mobile systems typically require larger support convoys and preparation time, which 
increase their vulnerability  to  detection  and  counter-attack.22  Both  India  and  Pakistan  have 
road-mobile  launchers  and  India has built  rail-mobile  launchers for its Agni missiles. 
Figure 2 illustrates  that the survivability of a  dispersed  mobile  missile force is quite 
high. Overall deterrence is maintained even if the opponent’s weapons have a high 
probability of finding  and  destroying  any single launcher  in  the  dispersed  force.  The figure 
graphs the probability of destroying all the  missiles  in  various  sizes of a  dispersed force 
versus various probabilities of destruction of a single la~ncher.2~ The probability of 
destroying  a large proportion of the total  number of launchers in all but  very  small force 
sizes is quite small. 
The conclusion of this analysis  is  that  deployed  Indian  and  Pakistani  missile forces 
are survivable.  Consequently,  neither  is likely to be  tempted  to  conduct  a  preemptive  strike 
that  will  disable its enemy.  Nor is either  country  likely  to feel that it must  launch its own 
forces on f is t  indications  of  attack  because it fears  losing  them.  Therefore, crisis stability 
appears to be  well  established  between  India  and  Pakistan  with  each  having  a  sufficient 
number of missiles to prevent an adversary from destroying them all (or even from 
destroying a sufficient number so the attacker’s own damage would be lessened). Thus 
increased  pre-launch  survivability  strongly  increases  stability. 
zz Z. Mian, A.H. Nayyar, M.V R m m a ;  “Bringing  F’rithvi Down to Earth: The  Capabilities and  Potential 
Effectiveness of India’s  Pritbvi Missile,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 7.3, (1998) pp. 333-360. 
These  results are based on the mathematical  analysis  that if the  probability of finding and destroying  a 
single  launcher is p. then  the  probability of finding and destroying  N  launchers is p”. 
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probabi l i ty  d destruction d all launchers wsus number of 
launchers and p r o b a b i l i t y  "p" of finding and destroylng any one 
launcher - p = 0.1,0.5,0.9 
1 
N, nu- of launchers 
Figure 2: Probability of destruction of all  launchers  as  a  function of the  number of 
launchers  and  probability of finding  and  destroying  any  one  launcher 
3.2.4. Accuracy 
Circular error probable (CEP), the most common statistical measure of missile 
accuracy, is the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the missiles aimed at the 
center of the circle will strike. Missiles currently in the stockpiles of regional powers 
typically have CEPs in  the  range of 300 to 1000 m. Thus, warheads  with  relatively large 
effects radii, such as WMD, are needed to achieve a significant probability of destroying a 
target. Missiles  with  low  accuracy  armed  with  conventional  weapons  have  limited  utility. 
They can, however,  can be used as terror  weapons to demoralize civilian  populations as 
Iraq  did in its war  with  Iran  during  in  the  1980s. 
Advances in guidance technology, including the use of the Global Positioning 
System (GPS),  may reduce CEPs to less than 100 m.  Should this occur, the effectiveness 
of conventional  warheads  against  unhardened tactical military  targets  (e.g.,  supply dumps) 
would be greatly increased. Lower yield nuclear weapons (with less collateral damage) 
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might  also  be  contemplated.  Increasing  accuracy,  therefore,  creates  new  target  options for 
a  medium  destabilizing  effect. 
3.2-5. Autonomy  after  Launch 
Once launched,  missiles are fully  autonomous  and  cannot  be  recalled or diverted. 
The  lack of control  once  a missile is launched  means  that  the  reliability of the  command 
and control  system is crucial. In contrast,  there  are  cases  of  manned  aircraft  being  recalled 
or diverted to other targets in flight. During periods of tension, an unauthorized or 
accidental  launch  might  precipitate  a  conflict. Such a  launch  is quite unlikely  however. The 
combination of autonomy  with the potential for an  accidental  or  unauthorized  launch  has  a 
weak  negative  effect  on  stability. 
3.2-6. Response  Time I 
Given  that  missile  flight  times are always  short (see Section 3.2.1), warning  times 
are  less, due to  the  time  required for sensors  to  detect  and  identify  an  attacking  missile. 
Response  times are further  reduced  by  the delay in  communicating  information  to  decision 
makers, assessing information, making decisions, and fiially giving orders on how to 
respond. A strategic  response  might be to  adopt  a  launch-on-warning  posture.  Missiles  can 
be  kept  in  various  stages of readiness. They may be kept  ready for firing  within  minutes, 
although  continual  maintenance  must  be  performed. The risk with this strategy is that a 
country  may  respond  prematurely  as  a  result of not  having  time  to  fully  assess  the  warning 
information  received.  During  the  Cold  War,  a  number  of  incidents  involved  accidents  and 
misinterpretations  related to nuclear  weapons  and  delivery  systems. 
India  has  declared  a  policy of assured yet delayed  response  modeled  on  China’s 
approach. Pakistan’s policy is more ambiguous but probably similar. Both strategies 
probably  reflect  the  nations’  relatively  rudimentary  command  and  control  systems.  Given 
missile flight times, decreasing response times to the level where it makes a difference 
would require a massive restructuring of command and control systems. It may not be 
technically  feasible  to  achieve  this  goal.  The  requirement for the  highest  reliability  would 
place extreme stress on the systems. Furthermore, the deployment strategy for missiles 
would  have  to  be  completely  restructured  resulting  in  a  continuing  armed  and  ready-to- 
launch  status  with  commensurate  requirements  for  reliability  and  safety.  Consequently, a 
launch-on-warning  strategy  would  be  destabilizing. 
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A Missile  Sfabilify  Regime for South Asia 
3.2.7. Ambiguity  about  the  Type of Warhead 
Government  statements  frequently describe a missile system as “nuclear-capable.” 
This has  resulted in the perception  that ballistic missiles  in the inventories of India and 
Pakistan  have  both  conventional  and  nuclear  warheads.  Even if this is not  the reality, the 
assumption on the receiving end  will  likely  be  that  “any missile launched  against it must  be 
carrying  a  nuclear ~arhead.”’~ Aircraft have been  used  in  a  conventional  role  on  South 
Asian battlefields historically while ballistic missiles have never been used in any role. 
Thus aircraft, even  if capable of carrying  a nuclear warhead  (such as a  Jaguar  or F-16), do 
not  carry the same danger of misperception once detected.  Ambiguity regarding the nature 
of the warhead is exacerbated  by the operational requirement  for  opaqueness regarding the 
number  and  location  of  missiles.  Short-range,  conventionally  armed ballistic missiles  could 
quite conceivably be used  within the context of a  limited  war  doctrine.25  A  dual  nuclear- 
conventional capable system  is therefore quite destabilizing  because  the  opposing 
command  systems  will  likely have little reliable  information  about its mission or nature of 
its warhead. Therefore, ambiguity about the type of a  missile  warhead  strongly decreases 
stability. 
3.2.8. Stability  Features of Various  Missile  Characteristics  in  South  Asia 
Figure 3 presents a  graphical  summary  of stability effects of the seven 
characteristics of missiles  for South Asia. The direction of the arrow indicates whether  a 
characteristic is stabilizing or destabilizing and the length indicates the relative extent to 
which it causes  that effect. The lengths of the  arrows are intended to be purely qualitative, 
signifying  a  strong,  medium,  or  weak  effect. 
Naeem Ahmad Salik,  “Missile  Issues in  South Asia,” The Nonprol@eration  Review,  Summer 2002, 
Volume 9, Number 2, pp. 47-48. ’’ Several  analysts  have  written about the concept of limited war. See V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and 
Nuclear  Escalation  in South Asia,” The Nonprol@eration  Review,  Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 82-98. 
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Figure 3: A  qualitative  comparison of the  stabilizing/  destabilizing  effects  of  various 
missile  characteristics  in  South  Asia 
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A Missile Stabiliry Regime for  South Asia 
4. The Way Forward 
4.1. Indo-Pak Cooperation and the Current Environment 
Decreasing threat perceptions associated  with missiles and decreasing the resultant 
incentives for an arms race in South Asia are daunting goals. Tensions between Pakistan 
and India have generally been high, and the last five years have been among the most 
difficult since independence. Recent events have raised trust back to the level where 
bilateral discussions are possible (the bilateral process effectively stopped after the Kargil 
conflict). 
Missiles and nuclear weapons are not going to go away from South Asia in the 
foreseeable future. Their presence must thus be managed in a way that does not  add to their 
destabilizing features while preserving the elements of deterrence. The purpose of the 
conceptual restraint regime presented in the following sections is to: 
Decrease the  overall  perception  of threats created by missile development, 
induction, and deployment 
Remove  the ambiguity created by missiles capable of delivering both conventional 
and  nuclear  warheads 
Decrease the risk of an unintentional exchange of missiles 
Increase the time for communication and consultation during a crisis 
Avoid a missile race by capping the ability to develop new classes of missiles while 
maintaining the existing capability for deterrence. 
The following sections describe a set of options, both  unilateral  and bilateral, that 
could contribute to rebuilding the India-Pakistan relationship and prepare the  ground for 
subsequent steps in structural arms control. The purpose of this report is to stimulate 
thinking and constructive discussion about what kinds of initial steps towards restraint 
might be taken in South Asia. Current bilateral relations are not yet ready to accept 
cooperative forms of technical monitoring. Consequently, many of the initial steps in  the 
following  conceptual regime are declaratory and unilateral. Some have features that can be 
verified  by ongoing national intelligence activities. All have the potential to expand into 
bilateral cooperative actions. 
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4.2. A Phased  Approach I i 
Recognizing  the  difficulty  in rebuilding  India-Pakistan  relations,  we  have 
attempted  to  craft  a  phased  approach made up of three distinct phases. 
Phase 1: Tension  Reduction  Measures 
Given that relations have been poor in the recent past, a series of unilateral  and 
bilateral  measures are proposed to reduce  tensions  and  reinforce recent moves toward a 
constructive bilateral dialogue. Several bilateral military-to-military initiatives are also 
proposed. 
Phase 2: Conjidence  Building  Measures 
Once relations  have  begun to normalize,  the  process of confidence  building  should 
begin. This phase  formalizes  bilateral  understandings  developed in Phase 1. 
Phase 3: Arms Control 
When confidence  increases to the  point  where credible security  commitments  can 
be  made, arms control  agreements  should  be  negotiated. 
In the  next  section, details of  how such  a  phased  approach  could be implemented 
are  presented.  The  options  are  intended to be mutually reinforcing. Although all options 
contribute  to  the  establishment of a  stabilization  regime,  benefits  can still be  derived from 
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a  regime  that  selectively  incorporates  these  concepts. 
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5. Lighting  the Way 
5.1. Phase 1 - Tension Reducing Unilateral and Bllateral Measures 
The first phase  would consist of measures  that are designed to be  tension reducing, 
politically  acceptable  and  operationally simple to implement.  All  measures,  whether 
unilateral  or  bilateral,  would be in the self-interest of the party  undertaking  them. 
5.1.1. Unilateral Measures 
The list of measures  presented here is not  meant to be  exhaustive.  Rather,  we  seek 
to illustrate the types  of  measures  that  could form a  part  of this phase. 
Exercise restraint in public statements and displays of missiles. Official statements 
boast of the  power of the  nation’s missiles and imply that the government  is  ready 
to use them. These actions contribute to unrealistic  public  expectations about the 
national ability to use missiles that could make defusing a crisis problematic. 
Official  statements  should  be carefully worded to inform  rather  than  threaten  (e.g., 
name  a  targeted country). Missile  displays  should  be  restricted to military  facilities. 
National  Day  parades  should  not emphasize missiles as exceptional  weapons?6 
Reinvigorate existing agreements on notifications of military exercises. Existing 
agreements on notifications of military exercises, frozen for several  years,  should 
be reaffirmed  and  restarted.  The  existing  agreements  are,  by definition, bilateral  but 
restarting their  implementation  could  be  unilateral.  For  example, one country  could 
unilaterally make its declarations under the agreement even if the other did not 
respond at the same  time. A unilateral step hopefully, would  lead to reciprocity at 
some time  and  eventually  a full bilateral  resumption of  the  agreement. 
Declare no use of artillery rockets across the  Line of Control in Kashmir or the 
Actual Ground Position Line in the Siachen Glacier. Both India and Pakistan 
possess  unguided  artillery  rockets  whose  range (typically 50 km) exceeds that of 
conventional  artillery (typically 20 km). The  use of artillery rockets raises the risk 
they  might be mistaken for a  ballistic  missile  launch  and  thus escalate a conflict. 
Disavowing  their  use  would  reinforce the ceasefire declared  in  November 2003. 
26 Some  missile  monuments  in  Islamabad  were  taken down for  a  regional  summit of South  Asian  leaders  in 
January 2004. This unilateral  step by the  host was seen  by  many  observers as tension  reduction step which 
augured  well  for  making  the  atmosphere  conducive  for  the  momentous  event 
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e 
Declare that no nuclear warheads are routinely muted to missiles. An official 
declaration  to this effect would  decrease  tensions by reducing  ambiguity. 
Agree not to conduct flight  tests during crises. Although ballistic missile flight- 
tests are essential to validate technical designs, both India and Pakistan have 
created  a  process  in  which  the  timing of missile  tests  and  related  actions is used as 
an instrument of strategy. In the Compound Crises of 2001-2002, missile flight- 
tests and accompanying rhetoric were used as tools to send political signals of 
strategic deterrence and resolve.”  This  process  was  disparagingly  termed  as 
“missile  antics” by an Indian  official  spokesperson,  although  India  has  responded 
in a  tit-for-tat  fashion to ~akistan’s missile  tests?’ 
Continue and reinforce the practice of advance announcement of missile tests. 
Announcements of missile tests have been made informally after the Lahore 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The  notification  process  is  somewhat ad 
hoc without a clearly established prior notification period. India and Pakistan 
typically provide 2 to 3 days notice - an increase to 7 days notice will help to 
decouple  tests from political  events  and  still  provide  flexibility  for  technical 
development.  Each  side  would  be  better  prepared to observe  and  track  the  other’s 
tests when they occur, eliminating the possibility of hostile misperception, and 
providing  limited  transparency  about  missile  capabilities. If a  test  were  cancelled 
for technical reasons, that announcement would also be a confidence building 
measure.  In  a  parallel  move,  each  side  should declare their missile test sites.  The 
culture of security associated with missile development may resist declarations 
about test  sites.  However,  the  other  side  learns this information  after  a  test so there 
is no substantive  change  in  the status quo. The declaration  would remove 
ambiguity,  and  lead  to  better  observation of each other’s  tests.  These  steps  could be 
initiated  unilaterally,  and later converted into a formal bilateral  measure. 
*’ The  December 2001 attack  on  the  Indian  Parliament led to a  massive military  mobilization  by  India 
Eerilously close to war  when a second  attack occurred in May 2002 at  Kaluchak,  Kashmir. 
(matched by Pakistan)  and a confrontation along their  borders,  including  naval  deployments,  that  came 
impressed with such missile antics  by  Pakistan.” 
India’s  External Ministry spokeswoman  said  in a  televised statement on May 28,2002 that ‘7ndia  was  not 
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5.1.2. Bilateral  Measures 
e 
5.2. 
Institutionalize a forum to review and improve the implementation of existing 
CBMs. This forum should be established first at the bilateral level. It could be 
constituted with the assistance of interested third  parties ready to support CBMs. 
Strengthen existing agreements on notifications of military exercises. Existing 
agreements on notifications of military exercises could be strengthened by reducing 
the force levels at which  notifications are needed, as well as increasing the distance 
from the border  at  which troop movements need to be identified. Notifications of 
ballistic missile units participating in military exercises could be an important 
component  of enhanced agreements. 
Increase cooperation in international treaties and organizations. India and 
Pakistan should cooperate in the implementation of international treaties to which 
they are both parties. They  should also cooperate in the development of new global 
norms in the Conference on Disarmament. 
Initiate ofsicial military-to-military contacts. Military-to-military measures  that 
would facilitate mutual understanding. Although these options are not directly 
related to missiles, increased contacts between the militaries would  build 
experience in  bilateral relations that facilitates future bilateral security discussions. 
Initiate joint training for search  and rescue or anti-piracy missions. International 
agreements provide a framework for such cooperation. 
Encourage out-of-region joint peacekeeping. There are precedents for Indian 
and Pakistani cooperation in Somalia and Sierra Leone. 
Encourage joint participation in foreign military schools. Such interaction 
already occurs informally under  unplanned circumstances. 
Phase 2 -Confidence  Bullding  Measures 
The aim of the second phase of the proposed process is to establish strategic 
restraint. Starting from agreements  and understandings reached at the summits in Lahore in 
1999 and Agra in 2001, and  with  an increase in civility brought about by previous tension 
reducing measures, this phase will seek to reinforce, develop, and formalize the unilateral 
and  bilateral  measures instituted previously. 
Actions  taken in this phase could involve the following. 
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Developing joint delegations to various international bodies. Joint delegations 
could be sent as observers to international bodies with oversight of arms control 
agreements,  such  as  the  Organization for Security  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE). 
Declare some elements of the  national missile command and control structure. The 
lack of knowledge by one  side of the other’s  missile  command  and  control  structure 
increases  concerns  about  unauthorized or accidental  launches. The Lahore 
Declaration  recognized  this r i ~ k . 2 ~  This topic  obviously  contains  sensitive  national 
security  information  but  some  declarations  can still be  made.  An  example of such 
limited  transparency  could  be  the  establishment  and  announcement of a personnel 
reliability  program for missile  and  nuclear  weapon  crews. 
Formalize a bilateral missile test notification agreement. Unilateral  declarations  on 
missile  test flights and  test  sites  from  Phase 1 should be formalized into a bilateral 
agreement. The Lahore MOU called for, but  did  not  create, a formal mechanism 
requiring  advance  test n~tification.~’ 
Invite observers to missile tests or military exercises. These observers could be 
from third countries, media, and/or from the  other  country. The observers would 
increase transparency regarding capabilities and thereby enhance stability. The 
concept of inviting  observers  may be controversial.  However,  visitors  from  friendly 
countries  are  currently  invited to observe tests  and  national  media  televises  tests for 
later broadcast. Concern about exchanging observers will center on the potential 
loss of national  security  information  and  risk of loss of  national  prestige  if a test 
fails. Neither of these concerns is sufficiently significant to block an exchange. 
There is a large body of experience from international inspections in how to 
conduct  on-site  inspections  uch  that  unrelated  sensitive  information  is not 
compromised. A test  that fails catastrophically  will  be  obvious  to  national  technical 
means  (NTM)  systems so the  presence  of  observers  will  not  change  perceptions. 
z9 It stated “The  respective  governments .. . shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear  weapons  and  discuss concepts and doctrines with  a  view to elaborating  measures 
for confidence  building  in  the  nuclear  and  conventional  fields,  aimed  at  the  prevention of c flict.” 
ballistic  missile flight tests, and  shall conclude a  bilateral  agreement  in this  regard.” 
30 The text states: ‘The two sides  undertake to provide each other  with advance  notification in respect of 
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Bilaterally declare that missiles with less than 150 km range are non-nuclear 
systems. Short-range missiles have primarily tactical, war-fighting applications. 
Official government statements have described a “nuclear capability” for these 
missiles. There is much ambiguity about whether nuclear weapons actually exist 
for these systems and, if so, whether there are plans to use them  in  both 
conventional  and  nuclear roles. Consequently, the movement  of  any  missile  of this 
type for  any  reason  becomes  provocative. If a  conventional  conflict does break  out, 
the use of these systems in a conventional role could be mistaken for nuclear 
operations. Eliminating ambiguity about the type of warhead carried by these 
missiles would be a stabilizing measure. This option would set a precedent by 
declaring that the shortest range ballistic missiles in each national force (the 
Pakistani Hatf-1 and the Indian Prithvi-1) are non-nuclear. These missiles have 
limited potential as nuclear  delivery  systems  because of their  short  range. 
Establish new consultative lines of communication between command authorities 
The Director  General of Military  Operations  (DGMO) hotline has  functioned  for 
some time. This hotline is somewhat limited in regard to potential activities of 
concern conducted by missile and air forces. This option is intended to increase 
transparency in activities that might be perceived as threatening. New hotlines 
could also be  established  between  Air  Force  and  Navy  DGMOs.  This  cooperation 
implies that officials are always  willing to communicate  during  an  emergency. 
Establish “Risk Reduction Centers” at the National Command Authorities. The US 
and the USSR created Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) to facilitate 
communication and implement arms control and security agreements. India and 
Pakistan  could establish a  similar  institution  modified to account for South  Asian 
 condition^.^^ The Centers  would  serve as a tangible way  to  build  mutual trust and 
reassurance and prevent  misperceptions. 
3’ This author has proposed  the  establishment of “New  Communication  Mechanism” in a sepamte initiative 
by the Center for Strategic and International  Studies  (CSIS) to be published  in 2004. For a similar  proposal 
see  Colonel Rai? uz  &man  Khan,  “Pakistan  and  India: Can NRRCs Help Strengthen  Peace?”  Occasional 
Paper No. 49 (Washington  DC:  Stimson  Center, 2002). 
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8 Initiate additional military-to-military contacts. There are several  areas  where 
military-to-military contacts could be undertaken. Such interactions could also 
include personnel from civilian  defense  organizations. 
Coordinate  responses in hijacking,  piracy,  smuggling  or other border  incidents. 
Cooperation in non-sensitive  military-related  technical  topics  uch as the 
disposal  of  hazardous  chemicals or obsolete  munitions. 
5.3. Phase 3 - Structural Arms Control 
Once confidence has been increased, arms control agreements could be sought. 
Arms control regimes could involve placing operational restraints on missile forces or 
reducing numbers of weapons systems. Potential a r m s  control agreements include the 
following. 
Limit the number and frequencies of missile tests. The missile test notification 
agreement proposed in Phase 2 could evolve into an arms control agreement by 
limiting  certain  test  activities.  New  developmental  systems  require  more frequent 
tests. A limit would  serve to slow  or  cap  development  of  new,  potentially 
destabilizing  systems,  while  nabling  each side to maintain  the  safety  and 
reliability of their existing missile forces. A missile test limitation agreement 
(including  sea-launched  types)  could  include  some or all  the following features: 
o Declare  national test sites  and  restrict  testing  activity to these  locations 
o Declare  annual  plan for testing  and  limited  numbers of tests 
o Limit test frequency 
o Limit  flight  direction  and/or  range. 
Declare or establish an agreement that no missile garrisons will be located within 
a specified distance from the border. This declaration would prevent battlefield 
short-range  missiles  from  being  placed in a  high-alert  status.  Missiles are normally 
stored and maintained  in  garrisons. By keeping  missiles  a  significant distance (e.g., 
75-100 km) from the border relative to their range, missiles will be unable to 
launch in place and have  to  move  to  firing  sites  closer  to their targets. This adds 
stabilizing delay to a crisis. Verification might be conducted unilaterally using 
national intelligence systems, however inspection visits to declared garrisons by 
national  representatives,  third  parties, or international  media  could  be  conducted as 
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well.  The  successful  Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between  the 
US  and  USSR  contains  useful  precedents for inspections. 
Establish a bilateral agreement to declare  missiles with ranges between 150 and 
250 km range as non-nuclear systems. The bilateral declarations  made in Phase 2 
regarding the non-nuclear  status of specific  short-range  missiles  hould  be 
formalized into an  agreement  and  expanded to systems  with  up to 250 km  range. 
This would include the  Pakistani Hag-2 and the Indian Prithvi-2. 
Establish an agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles with less than 150 km range. 
Once short-range missiles have been assigned a solely conventional role, the 
elimination of the shortest range systems  should  be  considered. The conventional 
efficacy of such systems is limited as they have fairly large CEPs. Elimination 
could be  verified  using  monitoring  techniques from the INF and START Treaties. 
Establish a bilateral nuclear test ban. New or improved  missiles  will  likely require 
different  warhead  capabilities  (e.g.,  yield,  physical  size, weight). Achieving these 
capabilities is significantly easier if nuclear tests are conducted. Both India and 
Pakistan  have  been  observing  an i formal  nuclear  test  moratorium.  This 
moratorium was cited in the Lahore MOu3’ A bilateral agreement would be 
independent of the Comprehensive  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty  and  does  not  imply  a 
change in national positions on  that  treaty. A bilateral test  ban  would preserve the 
two nations’  existing  nuclear  deterrent  while  decreasing the potential  for an 
expensive missile and nuclear arms race. Verification of the test ban can be 
conducted by remote seismic and  radiochemical  monitoring  from locations within 
the respective  national  territories. The two  countries  could share nationally 
collected seismic and geophysical data. An additional measure, that would have 
significant potential as a confidence building measure, is to permit each side to 
establish seismic  monitoring  stations  within the territory of the other. These seismic 
stations, not be  located  in  or  even  near  national  nuclear  test  sites,  would  serve to 
confirm  measurements  made  from outside the country. 
32 The  text  states: ‘The two  sides shall  continue  to  abide  by  their  respective  unilateral  moratorium on
conducting  further  nuclear  test explosions  unless either side, in exercise of its  national  sovereignty  decides 
that  extraordinary events  have  jeopardized  its  supreme  interests.” 
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6. Conclusions 
Missiles  are  now  a fact of life in the security  dynamic  between  India  and  Pakistan. 
Their  entry into the  subcontinent is a  result  of  the  chronic  political  and  military  conflict 
since  independence. While serving  a  useful role as a  stabilizing  nuclear  and  conventional 
deterrent to aggression,  they  also  have  destabilizing effects such  as  being  a  tool for public 
propaganda,  stimulating  an arms race,  raising  concerns  about  plans  for  pre-emptive  strikes, 
blurring  the  distinction  between  conventional  and  nuclear  weapons,  and  risking  escalation 
as a  result of loss of control  during  a  conflict.  There  are  a  number of actions,  however,  that 
can  improve  current  conditions  and  head off future problems. 
The remedy for this instability lies in  mutual  restraint for missile-related  activities 
facilitated by selective  transparency.  This  paper  has  presented  a  conceptual  restraint  regime 
for India and Pakistan that  assumes  a  low initial level  of  confidence and evolves  over  time. 
Significant  early  steps are possible  that  build  on  precedents  and do not  require  extensive 
cooperation.  The  initial  goal of the  regime is to make  missiles  a  security  topic for bilateral 
discussion, initiate unilateral  steps  that are substantive  and  build  confidence,  and  set  the 
precedent for limited  bilateral  cooperation. A mid-term  phase  could  expand  transparency 
measures, formalize bilateral understandings, and begin discussion and experimentation 
with  monitoring  procedures. A long-term  phase  could include bilateral  agreements  limiting 
or reducing some characteristics of national  missile  forces  with  the cooperative 
incorporation of monitoring  and  verification. 
The  steps  presented  to  increase  stability  support  the  concept of minimum credible 
deterrence advocated by  both countries. In order to  be  most  effective, the options  presented 
should be integrated into a system, or regime, for stability. Public confidence in these 
initiatives is important. Public confidence drives politics, which, in turn, defines the 
acceptability of cooperation.  The  benefit of strategic  stability  needs  to  be made clear to the 
respective  publics.  The  process of building  a  restraint  regime of stability can evolve over 
time as confidence  and  experience  increase. 
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